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  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 07-3056
                    
                    
 CARLOS SATIZABAL,
Appellant
v.
LOUIS FOLINO; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE
COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
                    
 On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-1435)
Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe, District Judge
                    
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 5, 2009
BEFORE:  BARRY and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges,
and ACKERMAN, District Judge*
(Filed: March 27, 2009)
                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
                    
*The Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, Senior Judge of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
2This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from a District Court order
entered on June 19, 2007, denying appellant-petitioner Carlos Satizabal’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a provision of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) enacted in 1996.  Though the District Court
wrote its own opinion, it also adopted a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge
recommending that it deny the petition.  
The habeas corpus proceedings arose from Satizabal’s conviction in a
Pennsylvania common pleas court on May 4, 2001, for attempted murder, aggravated
assault, possession of an instrument of crime, and two counts of recklessly endangering
another person.  The Pennsylvania trial court sentenced him to a custodial term of 20 to
40 years to be followed by a consecutive term of nine years’ probation.  Satizabal filed an
appeal to the Superior Court from his conviction, arguing that his attorney had been
ineffective for failing to preserve a claim that the verdict had been against the weight of
the evidence.  The Superior Court affirmed his conviction.  Inasmuch as Satizabal did not
file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the state
appellate proceedings in his case ended on December 4, 2002, the last day on which he
could have sought Pennsylvania Supreme Court review.
On February 16, 2003, Satizabal filed a pro se petition in a Pennsylvania common
pleas court under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 9541, et seq. (West 1998).  Subsequently, the PCRA court appointed an
3attorney to represent Satizabal in the PCRA proceedings.  On August 5, 2003, the newly-
appointed attorney filed an amended PCRA petition on Satizabal’s behalf.  The PCRA
court, however, denied the amended petition on April 27, 2004, concluding that
Satizabal’s petition was without merit.  The PCRA court, in accordance with
Pennsylvania procedure, continued the matter for dismissal.  The following day, April 28,
2007, the court sent a notice to Satizabal’s attorney indicating that the PCRA petition
would be dismissed in 20 days, and on June 29, 2004, the PCRA court entered its order
formally dismissing the petition, thereby triggering a 30-day appeal period.  
Satizabal, though represented by an attorney, did not file a timely notice of appeal
to the Superior Court from the dismissal of the PCRA proceedings.  Instead, on August 8,
2004, after expiration of the 30-day appeal period from the June 29, 2004 order, his
attorney filed a nunc pro tunc Motion for Extension of Time to File a Notice of Appeal,
dated August 4, 2004, with the PCRA court.  The PCRA court on August 24, 2004,
granted his motion and on August 31, 2004, within the time the PCRA court allowed for
an appeal, Satizabal appealed to the Superior Court.  Notwithstanding the PCRA’s
attempted allowance of an appeal on an extended time basis, the Superior Court quashed
Satizabal’s appeal on July 29, 2005, as it held that the notice of appeal was not timely
because the PCRA court granted the extension after it had lost jurisdiction and, therefore,
its order allowing the late appeal was null and void.  The Superior Court accordingly
believed that because the appeal to it was untimely, it lacked jurisdiction to proceed. 
4Satizabal filed a petition for allocator to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but that court
denied his petition on March 8, 2006.
On April 5, 2006, Satizabal filed a petition for habeas corpus in the District Court
claiming that:  (1) the trial court violated his right to due process when it ruled that
Satizabal could not present evidence of another person’s motive to shoot the victim; (2)
his appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to present on direct appeal a claim
relating to a motive for the crime, an argument that would have pointed to someone else
as the offender; and (3) his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to preserve
Satizabal’s claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  By an order
entered June 19, 2007, the District Court dismissed the petition as time barred.  Though
we see no need to repeat its calculations, we point out that the District Court’s
determination undoubtedly was correct unless the time for filing the habeas corpus
petition had been sufficiently tolled, a possibility that the Court considered but rejected. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court considered both statutory and equitable tolling but
concluded that the period of statutory tolling was insufficient to save the petition and that
there was no basis for equitable tolling.  Nevertheless, the District Court, without making
an analysis of the merits of Satizabal’s claims for relief beyond stating the conclusion that
Satizabal “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” granted
him a certificate of appealability solely on the “limited issue of equitable tolling.” 
    The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation did not address the substantive1
issues in the case.
5
Satizabal then appealed to this Court.1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and we would have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253 if the District Court issued a valid
certificate of appealability.  See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 259-67 (3d Cir.
2000) (en banc).  In any event, we have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction.  We
exercise plenary review on this appeal.  See Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 211-12 (3d Cir.
2001).
A court may issue a certificate of appealability only if the applicant has made “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S.Ct. 1595 (2000).  The Supreme Court has
indicated that “when the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds
without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of
appealability] should issue (and an appeal of the district court’s order may be taken) if the
prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack,
529 U.S. at 478, 120 S.Ct. at 1600-01.
The District Court centered its opinion on a detailed discussion of its procedural
6determination that the petition was untimely.  The Court, however, did not address the
merits of Satizabal’s three claims for relief and thus, as Slack makes clear, the Court did
not state a basis on which it could grant a certificate of appealability.  
In this regard, AEDPA requires that the grant of a certificate of appealability
“indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the [requirements set forth by the statute].” 
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3).  Consequently, where the district court has dismissed the petition
on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only if the petitioner makes
both a credible showing that the procedural ruling was incorrect and a substantive
showing that the underlying habeas corpus petition alleges a deprivation of constitutional
rights.  Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 340-41 (3d Cir. 1999).  Clearly, obliging a
petitioner to demonstrate that the dual requirements for a certificate of appealability have
been met is entirely appropriate, for unless there is a possibility that an appeal would be
meritorious, it would be an exercise in futility for a court of appeals to entertain an appeal
from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus merely because the appeal was timely.  This
substantive requirement is in harmony with Congress’s intent expressed in AEDPA that
there be a basis for an appeal by a prisoner in a habeas case and, accordingly, that is why
a petitioner must obtain a certificate of appealability as a precondition of appeal. 
Inasmuch as the District Court did not address the basis on which Satizabal could
obtain relief, we could dismiss this motion for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the
certificate of appealability was invalid.  Indeed, appellees urge us to do just that.  We,
7however, believe that in fairness to Satizabal, we should remand the case to the District
Court for reconsideration of whether it will issue a certificate of appealability in
accordance with the dual requirements for it to do so.  On remand, the District Court may
issue a certificate of appealability if it determines that Satizabal has “made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).  But if it issues a
certificate of appealability, the Court should indicate the specific issue or issues on which
Satizabal has made his substantive showing even if it issues the certificate of
appealability solely on the procedural question involving equitable tolling.
For the foregoing reasons we will vacate the District Court’s order of June 19,
2007, to the extent that the Court granted a certificate of appealability, and we will
remand the case to that Court to reconsider whether to grant a certificate of appealability
in accordance with the requirements set forth in this opinion.  No costs shall be allowed
on this appeal.
